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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper presents some results from the largest rural labour market survey yet 
conducted in Mozambique. Evidence from three provinces shows that labour markets 
have a significant impact on the lives of a large number of poor people and that 
employers exercise considerable discretion in setting wages and conditions of casual, 
seasonal and permanent wage employment. The evidence presented comes from a 
combination of a quantitative survey based on purposive sampling with other 
techniques, including interviews with large farmers. The findings contrast with ideas 
that rural labour markets are irrelevant to poverty reduction policy formulation in 
Africa and the paper concludes with methodological, analytical and policy 
recommendations. 
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Introduction 
 
This paper presents some results from the largest rural labour market survey 
yet conducted in Mozambique. The survey shows that labour markets in the 
Mozambican countryside have a significant impact on the lives of a large number of 
poor people. Although some of the poorest Mozambicans are captured in this survey, 
not all of the men and women engaged in rural wage work (temporary or permanent) 
live in similarly deprived rural households - their levels of education, wages and 
experiences of poverty are very diverse.  The data show a range of labour market 
opportunities, characterised by great variations in barriers to entry, levels of pay, 
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contractual terms, and conditions of work.  These findings are difficult to explain in 
terms of conventional economic theory and, more importantly, lead to the conclusion 
that it is necessary to pay careful attention to the heterogeneity and dynamic features 
of rural labour markets when analysing trends in poverty and the impact of policy 
interventions in Africa. 
There is a stark contrast between these findings and the explicit or implicit 
assumptions made in some of the literature on rural economies in sub-Saharan Africa 
and on Mozambique specifically.  For example, a recently constructed model of rural 
household behaviour in post-war northern Mozambique rests on the assumption that 
there are, simply, no labour markets at all (Brück, 2004). Other researchers claim that 
“it will be very difficult to use wage labour markets as a policy tool to alleviate 
poverty” (Tschirley and Benfica, 2001, 338). The reason for this is that they assume 
that the poor do not have access to wage labour opportunities in Mozambique, 
especially to better paid work, and that all those who do have such access are already 
non-poor. In effect, this amounts to arguing that a ‘rural labour aristocracy’ bequeaths 
scarce wage labour opportunities inter-generationally, precluding opportunities for 
most poor people to benefit from labour market participation.  The implication is that 
the demand for wage labour is static and that the labour market is crisply bifurcated 
between those jobs available to non-poor rural Mozambicans and other wage 
employment that is so badly remunerated it could not conceivably make a dent in 
poverty levels. 1   
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 Binswanger et al. (1989) is a widely cited reference to support this view. A recent survey of some 
rather dated and inappropriate evidence similarly concludes that “non-market forms of labour exchange 
remain very common throughout rural Africa.  There is only limited evidence of these being displaced 
by wage labour” (White et al, 2006, 11).  The same authors cite a former World Bank chief economist 
for Africa who “crossed out any sections of African poverty assessments referring to rural labour 
markets since these did not exist” (p.3). 
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Nonetheless, Tschirley and Benfica acknowledge the lack of information 
about labour markets in rural Mozambique. Similarly, the Commission for Africa 
acknowledges the urgent need to build up more labour market information (2005, 
p.242); but their report has hardly any discussion at all of rural wage employment.2  
This omission is a striking feature of the Commission’s section on agriculture and 
rural development, as well as its section on “participating in growth”.  NEPAD also 
fails to mention rural wage employment in its “Comprehensive Africa Agriculture 
Development Programme” (2003).3 
Further discussion of the rationale for and the methodology used in the 
Mozambique Rural Labour Market Survey (MRLS) is provided in the first section of 
this paper.  The following sections focus on presenting the survey evidence covering 
both types and levels of payment for both agricultural and non-agricultural rural 
workers. Some of the nuanced detail of how people were paid, for example whether 
they were effectively paid per task or per day, are complex and do not emerge clearly 
in tabulations derived from the questionnaires administered to workers. Thus, the 
results of interviews with employers are also introduced in these sections; these help 
to emphasize the degree of employer discretion in setting payment levels and their 
power to enforce particular types of labour contract. It is argued that relationships 
between workers and employers cannot be understood within the simple frameworks 
of supply and demand or in terms of the neutral operation of imperfect markets. 
The heterogeneous characteristics of the workers participating in rural wage 
labour markets and the impact of employment on some simple measures of household 
welfare are also discussed. The evidence shows clearly that many Mozambicans, who 
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 On the inadequacy of African data on agricultural wage labour see Mwamadzingo, (2003, 31) and FAO-
ILO-IUF (2005, 21). 
3
 Many proposals to promote agricultural development in Africa, even those that do focus on such 
wage labour intensive crops as cotton, fail to mention the importance of the income currently earned 
through rural wage employment for the survival of the poorest Africans, e.g. Boughton et al (2003). 
 4 
would by any criteria be considered among the very poorest in the country, have been 
pitched into wage work. However, the evidence also shows important gradations in 
the severity of poverty among the rural wage labour force, as well as suggesting the 
potential for more decent jobs to transform the living standards of even the poorest 
rural women.  The conclusion discusses the significance of the survey findings and 
suggests that the research results imply a need for innovative policy design. 
 
Survey Rationale and Methodology 
 
The colonial era and the early years of independence, after 1975, as well as the 
war that lasted till 1992, were periods of profound rural change and social upheaval in 
Mozambique.  The formation of a class depending on wage employment was already 
deeply rooted at independence (O’Laughlin, 2002: 517; Castel-Branco, 1983). After 
independence, the ruling Frelimo party, ignoring the heterogeneity of rural society, 
implemented policies on the basis of a simple dualist assumption, pitting a 
homogeneous subsistence-oriented peasantry against a ‘commercial’ sector. During 
the war, the class stratification of rural society continued4, but differentiation 
processes were largely ignored by policy makers and academics alike and, as a result, 
the “dualist premises underlying the smallholder model now projected by critics of 
Frelimo’s socialist options are similarly flawed” (O’Laughlin, 1996: 1). 
Since the end of the war, new processes of economic and social change have 
begun to have substantial effects on the demand for labour and rural inequality. These 
changes have included: the rehabilitation of transport infrastructure; the influx of new 
foreign investment in agriculture, the immigration of farmers from both Zimbabwe 
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 Wuyts (2003) argues that socio-economic differentiation and the formation of labour markets in many 
areas accelerated during the war in Mozambique. 
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and South Africa (concentrated especially in Manica Province); the revival of tea 
plantations in Zambezia Province; the privatization of other state-owned plantations; 
and the rapid integration of small- and middle-scale farmers into international 
commodity markets (especially the markets for tobacco and cotton).5  
Unfortunately, the data collected in recent household surveys designed to 
provide poverty indicators are not useful for analysing the impact of these uneven 
developments on the market for wage labour. The usefulness of these household 
surveys is limited because they adopt international statistical conventions for 
measuring labour market participation that are ill-suited to the complex reality of 
labour transactions in poor rural areas.6 As shown in Table 1, the results from two 
recent household surveys in Mozambique, the Inquérito dos Agregados Familiares 
(IAF, 2002-3) and the Questionário de Indicadores Básicos de Bem-Estar (QUIBB, 
2000-1), yield surprisingly different measures of the relative significance of wage 
labour, depending on the specific questions asked in each of these surveys and their 
interpretation.  In particular, conventional questions in both of these surveys about 
rural respondents’ “main” job suggest that wage labour is rare - only about 7.3 percent 
of household members in the QUIBB survey, or 4.7 percent in IAF, claimed to have 
been paid a wage or salary in their main job.7  In contrast, almost 21 percent of rural 
households in IAF, but only 17.4 percent in QUIBB,  claimed that a household 
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6
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 Most standard survey questionnaires ask questions about the “main” activity and they focus on only 
those activities undertaken during a very short reference period, i.e. the last seven days. Given the 
complexity of rural people’s strategies of time management, and given the variability of economic 
activities across agricultural seasons, this approach tends to generate simplistic, misleading information. 
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member had been employed as an agricultural labourer in the most recent 
agricultural season.8  
 
Table 1. Responses to Questions about Wage Labour at Household and Individual Level  
(IAF2002 and QUIBB2000) 
 
Did any household/member work as 
seasonal or casual labourer last 
agricultural season?  
(% responding yes) 
How was NAME paid in main job?  
(% responding with a wage/salary)  
IAF 2002/2003 
National  16.3 13.4 
Rural 20.9        4.7 
Urban 6.5 36.2 
QUIBB 2000/2001 
National  14.0 15.3 
Rural 17.4 7.3 
Urban 6.3 39.6 
Source: Authors’ calculations from IAF 2002-3 database 
 
The Mozambique Rural Labour Market Survey (MRLS) was designed to 
overcome some of the limitations of household surveys.  During 2002-3, fieldwork 
was completed in three provinces in the centre and north of the country: Manica, 
Nampula and Zambezia, where 2,638 wage-employed respondents (slightly less than 
half of them women) answered a lengthy questionnaire and provided information not 
only about themselves but also about other household members. As a result, the 
survey collected data on some 16,000 individuals in these provinces. The respondents 
were employed by a wide range of different types of establishment (around 900 
separate enterprises), varying from very small farms, bars, and market stalls to large 
plantations employing thousands of temporary workers.  
The sampling was purposive rather than random. There was, of course, no 
reliable sampling frame on which to base a random sample of rural wage workers.9 
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 The gap between the IAF and QUIBB results is one of a number of anomalies in the QUIBB data on 
rural wage employment.  For example, examination of the raw data revealed that 80 percent of 
households farming very large areas, i.e households cultivating more than 20 hectares and several 
cultivating more than 100 hectares, made the implausible claim that they never employed any hired 
labour.  
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The research team therefore used a range of sources to construct, as completely as 
possible, its own sampling frames on the basis of existing agricultural censuses, recent 
household survey lists and visits to all the relevant provinces and districts to assemble: 
lists of large and middle-scale farms; lists of households reporting hiring-in or out of 
wage labour; lists of those enumeration areas that had experienced a recent episode of 
relatively dynamic economic growth and structural change, but had not been covered 
by previous household surveys (IAF, QUIBB); and the names and location of other 
employers in different districts of Nampula, Zambézia and Manica.10 This preliminary 
work to establish sampling lists provided some assurance that the MRLS would not 
miss either the most significant rural employers, or those enumeration areas where 
wage employment was particularly important in each of the provinces.   
The sample purposively included a relatively large number of small and 
middle-scale farmers.  The most successful of these farmers, who account for much 
of the demand for agricultural wage labour, are non-randomly distributed in rural 
Mozambique and there is, therefore, no guarantee that their wage workers would be 
included in conventional, randomised sample surveys. The range of occupations and 
types of employer captured was large enough to ensure that sufficient diversity was 
achieved to make the results statistically relevant and to obtain a well-targeted 
coverage of the most important rural labour markets within the selected provinces.  
Comparisons between this research and the results of the nationally 
representative IAF survey establish two important points. First, the purposive 
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 The official statistics not only fail to collect information on employees in enterprises employing fewer 
than 10 workers, but also exclude many enterprises employing more than 10 workers if, as is often the 
case, these enterprises are not legally registered.  Ministry of Labour officials lack the resources, 
training or incentives to investigate employment, especially seasonal and temporary employment in 
many local firms. 
10
 The three central and northern provinces were selected because the importance of rural wage labour 
in the south is quite well recognised and documented in the literature on Mozambique (O’Laughlin 
2002). Moreover, these provinces also account for the bulk of labour intensive cash crop production 
(cotton, tobacco, sisal and tea) and Nampula and Zambezia contain a very large proportion of the 
Mozambican rural population. 
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sampling of people working for wages in the MRLS succeeded in capturing many 
respondents who would certainly be classified by IAF as among the poorest 
Mozambicans (see Table 2). Thus, the bottom third of the MRLS sample, ranked 
according to a simple but robust household asset index, is at least as poor or poorer 
than the bottom quintile of households surveyed by IAF in the same provinces, both 
in terms of their ownership of key assets and in terms of the level of education 
achieved by household members.11 As Table 2 shows, fewer of the poorest tercile of 
MRLS respondents in Manica own a bicycle, a watch or a radio than the poorest 
quintile of IAF respondents in that province. And in all three provinces fewer MRLS 
respondents had eaten meat within the last week or owned a watch. Educational status 
is known to be closely associated with other measures of poverty in Mozambique 
(Simler et al. 2004); it is noteworthy that 80 percent or more of the poorest 
households in both MRLS and IAF (with the surprising exception of IAF respondents 
in Manica) failed to complete primary school. Other education statistics and most 
demographic statistics suggest the whole sample of rural wage workers in the MRLS 
is not atypical or biased, since results are not statistically different from the IAF rural 
samples in the same provinces.12  
 
Table 2. Assets and Education Compared: MRLS and IAF Surveys 
Percentage of poorest 
quintile (IAF) / tercile 
(RLM) 
Nampula Zambézia Manica 
Variable IAF02 RLMS02 IAF02 RLMS02 IAF02 RLMS02 
Bicycle (owns) 29 29 23 36 47 21 
Radio (owns) 44 46 25 41 56 47 
Watch (owns) 6 3 14 4 31 6 
Meat eaten last week  24 14 15 9 31 15 
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 Sender, Oya and Cramer (2006) discuss asset index methodology.  
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 The main demographic peculiarity of the MRLS sample was the large proportion (40 percent) of 
separated, divorced or widowed women among female respondents, which was an important finding in 
itself. 
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Three meals per day 
16 13 19 2 33 48 
Primary education 
not completed 87 86 80 85 63 81 
Sources: IAF, 2002/03; MRLS, 2002/03. 
 
Second, the MRLS shows that rural inequality is very significant. This result 
too cannot be used to suggest that the MRLS sample is atypical. Nationally 
representative surveys have also found similarly high levels of inequality within rural 
Mozambique (Elbers et al., 2003). In sum, the purposively sampled survey is an 
important and policy-relevant complement to standard survey techniques; both the 
questionnaire design and the MRLS sampling procedures were planned specifically to 
fill in gaps that are common to household surveys in Africa (Sender, Cramer and Oya, 
2005). 
This paper not only reports findings from 2,638 respondents to the MRLS 
questionnaire, but also from 120 respondents to a different questionnaire administered 
to a sample of small and medium-scale agricultural employers. In addition, the 
researchers conducted semi-structured interviews with 33 large-scale employers, all 
employing more than 50 workers at the peak of the agricultural year, and collected the 
life histories of 15 female wage workers.13 Thus, this paper aims to combine the 
findings of representative and purposive sample surveys with qualitative material to 
challenge both the policy conclusions reached in much of the current literature on 
rural Mozambique, as well as some of the methods commonly used.  
 
Variations in Methods of Pay: Monthly, Daily, and Piecework Pay 
 
Payment arrangements in rural labour markets are extremely complex.  They 
are difficult to investigate and summarise (Hatlebakk, 2004; Rogaly, 2005). The 
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literature on piece-rate systems and farm wage differentials attempts to explain 
marked differences between how workers are paid, even when they are doing similar 
things and in comparable locations. The focus in this literature is often on the costs of 
labour recruitment and supervision faced by employers and on the implications of 
different payment methods for labour productivity, although many other, non-
neoclassical explanations for observed variations in payment methods have also been 
investigated (Newman and Jarvis 2000; Rubin and Perloff 1993; Rogaly, 2005; Wells, 
1996; Bardhan and Rudra 1986; Ortiz 1999).  In Mozambique, forms and levels of 
payment vary within provinces from one rural area to another; they appear to be 
influenced by cropping patterns as well as by the strategies adopted by individual 
employers, making any general statement about prevailing methods on Mozambican 
farms questionable.     
The discussion in this and the following sections pays particular attention to 
analysing different categories of employer as a proxy for the demand side factors 
accounting for payment variance.  However, the influence of other factors like the 
specific tasks (weeding, harvesting, grading, etc) set for each crop, the season, and the 
precise location of the enterprise are also examined, when the data are available.14 
Useful information was extracted from open-ended questions on job/task descriptions 
in order to identify differences in payments arising from task or employer 
characteristics and to qualify and correct responses to coded questions on pay rates. 
The main payment methods in rural Mozambique include daily wages, 
monthly salaries, and piece- and task-based cash payments.  The MRLS found little 
evidence of payment systems based on negotiations with labour brokers, i.e. contracts 
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 It was not always possible to collect systematic, detailed and codified evidence to compare exactly 
the same agricultural operations performed in the same season by different workers.  Most seasonal and 
casual workers performed a wide range of tasks for the same employer, from clearing/stumping to 
weeding and harvesting, but they only reported one payment type or rate to the MRLS enumerators. 
 11 
for the supply of gangs of labourers by intermediaries. Table 3 shows the distribution 
of the main methods of payment, based on classifying workers’ responses to both 
coded and open-ended questions.  However, in many of these responses the 
distinction between (unwritten) contracts to purchase labour time and contracts to 
complete a specific task was unclear, so the classifications in Table 3 should be 
regarded as ‘best estimates’, rather than definitive. The remuneration of workers with 
food, prepared meals and other non-cash benefits is discussed later (Tables 5 and 10). 
 In the whole sample, roughly 40 percent of respondents received a monthly 
wage. However, more than two thirds of the respondents employed as agricultural 
labourers were not paid on a monthly basis.  An even larger proportion (almost 80 per 
cent) of the agricultural workers employed by local farmers (small Mozambican 
farmers or medium-scale private farmers known as privados), were paid either by task 
or on a daily basis.15  In contrast, over 80 percent of agricultural workers employed on 
foreign-owned firms were paid monthly wages.16      
 
Table 3: Wage Payment Methods for Agricultural and Non-Agricultural Workers, by 
Type of Employer 
Data in % 
Agricultural 
labour 
(2171) 
Non 
Agricultural 
labour 
(467) 
National 
company/ 
plantation 
(268) 
Foreign 
company/ 
privado 
(227) 
Local 
farmer/ 
privado 
(1657) 
Other** 
 
  
(469) 
Total 
 
 
(2620) 
Daily wage 20 4 36 9 18 6 17 
Weekly wage 2 0 0 2 2 0 1 
Monthly wage 30 86 44 81 21 83 40 
Based on specific 
contract/ work 
2 5 2 1 2 4 2 
Piece/task rate  47 4 17 7 57 4 39 
Other 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 
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 Note that the survey of 120 Small and Medium Employers (SMEs) confirms these results:  only 22 
percent of respondents employed ‘permanent’, monthly paid workers (almost invariably men), usually 
living with them for most of the year or working for the whole agricultural season.  However, almost 
all of these respondents employed casual workers (94 percent); their casual workers, both males and 
females, were paid on a task rate basis (77 percent), rather than daily.   
16
 A ‘foreign company/privado’ is defined as an establishment run by foreign managers and/or mostly 
owned by foreign investors. ‘Local farmers/privados’ encompass a more heterogeneous mix of national 
and local small and medium-scale individual farmers employing workers for wages. 
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Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
aNumber in brackets shows the total number of observations for each category. 
** Includes non- agricultural labour.  
Source: MRLS, 2002/03 
 
Payment methods on the larger farms, particularly on ‘foreign’ or ‘national 
corporations’, were more clearly defined than on other types of farm where the 
variation in payment methods and rates was particularly large.  Table 4 shows that 
larger farming enterprises are more likely to employ monthly paid workers than 
smaller farmers.  However, many of the large employers recorded as paying a 
monthly wage to temporary workers were, in fact, applying a daily rate (often derived 
from the legal monthly minimum rate), although the number of days of work required 
per month was specified at the discretion of individual employers.17 
 
Table 4: Wage Payment Methods by Size of Establishment (Agricultural Workers)  
  
Category of employer  
by no. of workers at peak Total 
  
Small  
employera 
   (723) 
Middle 
employerb         
(754) 
Large 
employerc 
(694) 
All 
Employers 
(...)  
Daily  
wage (%) 14 18 28 20 
Weekly  
wage  (%) 1 2 2 2 
Monthly  
wage  (%) 15 33 42 30 
Based on specific 
contract/work  (%) 3 1 1 2 
Piece/task  
rate  (%)  67 46 26 47 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Notes: a 1-10 workers; b11-50 workers;  c50+ workers 
Source: MRLS, 2002/03 
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 Most of the 33 large-scale employers interviewed by the research team claimed to use the national 
minimum wage of MT560,000 a month as a reference for pro rata, daily wage rates for unskilled 
labourers.  However, some used MT565,000 or MT575,000 as a reference rate, while one used 
MT500,000 a month.  The most common form of variation in daily payment rates reported by these 
employers was in the number of the days used to divide into the monthly wage reference rate. Thus, 
some workers might be paid MT18,000 a day (dividing the monthly minimum wage by 31), others 
MT21,500 (dividing by 26), while some farmers ignored the monthly minimum wage when setting the 
daily rate.  
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Larger farms also need to employ a great many temporary workers for one to 
three months to meet seasonal labour peaks.  These workers are usually required to 
complete the task set by their employers before they receive a ‘daily’ payment.  What 
was involved in tasks varied, as did the judgement of what could be done in a day and 
of how many hours a casual worker should be expected to work. On some farms there 
was a stable daily wage paid for seasonal tasks, but these tasks would vary in intensity. 
Yet on other farms the daily wage varied according to the task set. For example, on a 
large joint venture farm in Nampula Province growing sisal and cotton, day workers 
were paid MT31, 347 a day for a set task (cutting 98 piles of sisal leaf), but for 
clearing weeds in sisal fields the rate was MT21,577 (for three ‘lines’ of weeding). 
Table 5 below gives some idea of the latitude for setting differing wage rates for 
weeding. Meanwhile, some of the farmers interviewed in the sample of large farmers 
pointed out that, if an individual worker could not finish the proposed task within a 
day, he or she would either return the next day to finish the task or bring in friends or 
family (including children) to help complete the task.  
Table 5: Daily Pay for Weeding by Selected Large and Mid-Scale 
Employers  in Nampula (Meticais)  
 
Employer Daily Rate for Casual Labourers Weeding Task per day 
Tobacco mid-
scale local 
farmer - Manica 
20,000 50 x 20 ‘steps’ 
Sisal company - 
Nampula 21,577 3 ‘lines’ 
Mid-scale local 
farmer - 
Nampula 
15 fishes or 2kg sugar or 2 bars soap 50-100 x 2 metres 
Mid-scale cotton 
farmer - 
Nampula 
20,000 6/7 lines 
Large local 
farmer - 
Nampula 
10 fishes 15-20 x 2 metres 
Large local 
farmer - 
Nampulaa 
20,000 5 lines 
Large local 
Farmer - 10,000 10 lines 
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Nampulab 
Note: a for tough weeding; b for lighter weeding. 
Source: MRLS, 2002/03 
 
On the larger farms in the sample, with hundreds of casual workers at peaks of 
the agricultural cycle, employers often paid a bonus for work well done or for a 
regular presence on the farm. Although some respondents only performed an 
occasional day of ganho ganho (casual) labour on these farms, employers appeared to 
prefer offering longer (unwritten) contracts - typically for one to three months - to 
‘daily’ labourers. For example, on one farm five days of ‘good work’ earned a 
temporary worker a bonus of MT6,000. On another farm the employer offered 
MT5,000 per day on top of the daily wage, payable on the last day of an agreed span 
of work and conditional on the employee having turned up regularly. In many cases it 
is left to field supervisors to judge whether a task has been done satisfactorily or 
whether a bonus has been earned.18 As one South African farmer in Manica Province 
put it, the daily wage is MT18,000 but “it depends”. 
Local farmers/privados paid some of their ‘regular’ workers on a monthly 
basis, even if they did not work every month of the year, but only 21 per cent of their 
workers were ‘regular’ in this sense. Smaller employers rely much more heavily on 
task-based payment systems. The tasks their workers have to perform are even less 
clearly defined than on the large farms and require widely varying amounts of time 
and effort to complete, making it extremely difficult to calculate the wage received 
per hour or per day.19 One important advantage of task-based payment systems is that 
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 One of the women interviewed for the life stories described the power wielded by her supervisor.  
She had worked carrying tobacco leaves and the set task involved carrying 140 strings.  However, the 
supervisor arbitrarily increased the task and then began to insult her when she lacked the physical 
strength to reach the new target.  So she requested a transfer to do ‘lighter’ work with the weeding team.  
Unfortunately, the same man was re-assigned to supervise this team and singled her out for abuse and 
tried to dock her payments.  She felt she had no alternative but to leave the plantation where she had 
been working for three years and, at the time of the interview had been unemployed for two weeks.   
19
 Maninha, whose life story is discussed in Sender et al (2006), was often set tasks for MT10,000 by 
small-scale farmers that were so strenuous that they could not be completed in a day, especially if she 
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they allow privados  to incorporate the labour efforts of female and child labour 
without having to contract (or pay) these workers directly.  Thus, a woman who has 
difficulty completing the task set by her employer will bring along her children and 
female relatives to ‘help’ with the work.  Similarly, if husbands are reluctant to allow 
their wives to work on other men’s farms as independent wage workers, then an 
employer can gain access to the labour of married women by setting their male 
workers tasks that cannot be completed easily without the ‘help’ of their wives. 
Payment methods are determined not only by the size and ownership 
characteristics of farms, but also appear to depend on the crop and the farming 
operation.  An analysis of 733 responses to open-ended questions concerning 
agricultural tasks (mainly from the sample in Nampula province) reveals the 
following patterns:  
a) Where the main crop farmed is cotton, a combination of daily wages and 
piece-rates is clearly the most important payment method;  
b) Work in cultivating maize, cashew and rice is almost always paid on a task 
or piece-rate, rather than a daily or monthly, basis;  
c) Where tobacco, sisal and horticulture are the main crops, the proportion of 
more regular, monthly-paid workers is much higher;  
d) Weeding and harvesting are more likely to be paid on a task or piece-rate 
basis (especially in cotton and cashew), whereas clearing and stumping 
(mainly for sisal) are usually paid on a daily or monthly basis;20  
 
                                                                                                                                            
took a break for a meal.  Maninha was often obliged to return the following day in order to complete 
the set task and earn the MT10, 000 quoted as the daily wage by the small farmers who employed her.  
In contrast, a larger farmer has paid her MT50, 000 for a task she could complete in a day. 
20
 Since sisal is mainly grown by rather larger scale enterprises and most of those engaged in ‘clearing 
and stumping’ are sisal workers, it is likely that their payment methods are influenced by the scale of 
the enterprise, rather than the nature of the task they perform.  However, the direction of causality may 
be complex, with certain types of employer preferring to specialize in producing particular crops. 
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Variations in Rates of Pay for Agricultural Work 
 
How much people can earn on different types of farm enterprise also varies. 
The median monthly wage ranges from a low of MT250,000 for people working for 
local farmers or neighbours, through MT381,000 earned on the farms of privados, up 
to MT460,000 on Mozambican-owned companies and plantations and MT525,000 on 
foreign enterprises. The range of daily, as opposed to monthly wage payments, is 
more compressed, varying from a low median rate of MT10,000 per day paid by local 
or neighbouring farmers to a high of around MT15,000 paid by national and foreign 
agricultural companies. The modal as well as the median daily payment rate 
(MT10,000)21 was equivalent to about $0.42 cents/day, at the exchange rate prevailing 
during the main period of fieldwork.22 
Distinguishing employers by size (defined in terms of the number of workers 
employed at the peak of the agricultural year), rather than by ownership type, reveals 
a similar pattern of variation in rates of pay, as seen in Table 6, below.23 The fact that 
larger enterprises tend to pay their workers more is hardly surprising. However, the 
widespread belief that concentrating resources on small farm agriculture and food 
production will reduce African poverty ignores the fact that many of the poorest rural 
people depend on earnings from agricultural wage labour.  Small farmers in the 
MRLS, especially food producers, do not offer very high or regular wages to their 
workers. 
                                                 
21
 The SME survey confirms that there is a widely accepted ‘norm’ for daily payments. Thus, a high 
proportion of the employers in this survey paid 10,000 Mt per day for a range of tasks, especially 
weeding.  There was remarkably little variance in employers’ responses to questions about daily 
payments to temporary workers in this sample. 
22
 The mean exchange rate for May 2002 to the beginning of February 2003 was about $1 = MT23,700.   
23
 Only 15 percent of the small-middle employer sample employ permanent (male) workers on a 
monthly paid basis; the wages they pay average 273,000 MT per month (median = 250,000 MT), i.e. 
less than the median monthly wages paid by the larger employers and less than 50 percent of the 
minimum wage. Some of these relatively small employers do pay above average wages, if they are 
more prosperous and educated.  Thus, the highest wages in the SME sample are paid by respondents 
with the highest asset possession score and the largest number of years of completed education.   
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Table 6: Payment Rates by Size of Agricultural Employer  
Size of employer, by no. of 
workers at peak   
Daily wage Monthly wage 
N 99 115 
Mean 13885 285257 
Small employer (1-10) 
  
  
  
Median 10000 250000 
N 156 272 
Mean 11422 371763 
Middle employer (11-50) 
  
  Median 10000 350000 
N 210 358 
Mean 15691 463913 
Large employer (50+) 
  
  
  
Median 15000 460000 
Total N 465 745 
Source: MRLS, 2002/03 
 
Workers engaged in the production of some crops are more highly paid than 
workers on other crops. 24  For example, Table 7, below, shows payment rates on 
cotton and sisal farms in Nampula and on rice growing farms in Zambezia. Work on 
sisal and cotton growing enterprises is relatively highly paid (at a median daily rate of 
MT14, 000 and MT25,000, respectively), compared to work on food crops such as 
rice, maize, groundnuts, sesame, etc. (typically paid at the rate of MT10,000 per day). 
Men usually cut sisal and this work is arduous, involving risks of cuts and snake-bites.  
Thus, some combination of gendered job segregation and the need to provide 
incentives for dangerous and unpleasant work may account for relatively high 
payment rates on sisal plantations. However, higher payments for sisal and cotton 
cultivation are also probably a result of the fact that these crops are commonly grown 
on larger farms or plantations, usually owned and managed by national privados or 
corporations.  
 In general, cotton workers are relatively highly paid, but their rates of pay vary 
dramatically, even when all the workers concerned are employed within one province 
to carry out a very standard task such as harvesting.  For example, an examination of 
                                                 
24
 Thus, tobacco out-growers paid higher wages than the SME respondents growing other crops. 
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payments made to 122 cotton pickers in Nampula, who were usually paid on either a 
daily or a piece rate basis, reveals a large range of levels of pay (Table 7). This Table 
shows that the range of payments made for similar tasks to workers cultivating cotton, 
sisal and rice in a single province is still significant, even if there is generally a lower 
standard deviation than for less disaggregated comparisons of wider groups of 
workers. 25  
 
 
Table 7: Payment Rates for Cotton, Sisal and Rice Workers* 
 Monthly Daily Task/piece rate 
Cotton (Nampula)    
 Harvesting  - (53) (69) 
  Mean - 14,017 443 
  Median - 14,000 400 
  Standard deviation 
 
- 2,374 222 
Sisal (Nampula) (11) (31) (5) 
  Mean 524,636 21,737 10,600 
  Median 546,000 25,000 1,000 
  Standard deviation 
 
59,104 5,523 16,891 
Rice (Zambezia) - - (38) 
  Mean - - 11,447 
  Median - - 10,000 
  Standard deviation  - - 2,575 
    
*Bracketed figures refer to the number of workers in the sub-sample. 
Source: MRLS, 2002/03 
 
A small sub-sample of workers employed to harvest cashew nuts, all paid on a 
piece rate basis and working on the same farm in Nampula, also showed a surprising 
degree of variation in rates of payment.  These differences in task payments could not 
be explained by reference to the gender, levels of education or age of the workers, 
although the lowest recorded rates per task were paid to very young workers. Thus, 
out of 19 workers in this sub-sample, eight received less than MT5,000 and five 
                                                 
25
 This evidence does not corroborate the existence of payment ‘norms’ and ‘conventions’, which have 
been found elsewhere. The importance of norms and conventions in poor agrarian labour markets has 
been discussed by Bardhan and Rudra (1986). Breman (1985) criticises the idea of norms of ‘fairness’ 
in Indian labour markets. 
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obtained MT10,000 per task (Table 8) .26 This simple case illustrates the idiosyncratic 
spread of payment rates, particularly when they are on a task or piece-basis, and 
suggests the difficulties involved in using standard Mincerian equations to explain 
variations in these rates.27 
 
 
 
Table 8:  Piece rates on a cashew-nut farm for harvesting  
(Nampula) 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
MT2000 1 5.3 5.3 
MT2500 1 5.3 10.5 
MT3000 6 31.6 42.1 
MT5000 6 31.6 73.7 
MT10000 5 26.3 100.0 
Total 19 100.0   
Source: MRLS, 2002/03 
 
 
It is also difficult to account for the variation in monthly wage payments 
received by another sub-group of workers, all of whom were male, semi-skilled and 
working on large scale farms. Some of the interviews with large farmers yielded 
information on the range of salaries they had decided to pay their tractor drivers. The 
lowest reported monthly wage for a tractor driver was MT600,000 and the highest 
was MT1.5 million. Most drivers were reported to earn around MT800,000, though a 
few were earning less and a handful were paid more than MT1 million monthly.  
Wages for other related jobs – e.g. foremen, field captains, supervisors – also 
differed across these large-scale employers, from MT700,000 per month to MT2.5 
                                                 
26
 In fact the range of payments on this farm was even larger than shown in the Table, which excludes 
outliers (all payments of more than MT10,000 per task and one of MT30,000 per task). 
27
 On the inability of standard neo-classical wage functions to explain agricultural wages in terms of 
worker attributes, see Datt (1996:66-7). 
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million. In addition, interviews with large farmers revealed an astonishingly wide 
range of monthly payments to their most senior, skilled workers.  Skilled permanent 
workers earned between MT800,000 and MT3,000,000 a month. On a couple of the 
farms in this sample, employers reported that they paid skilled permanent workers 
below the minimum wage but that these workers received some payment in kind and 
were not expected to work more than four hours a day. At the other extreme, on one 
farm the top rate for a skilled worker was MT8.5 million, while on another two 
expatriate Malawian junior agronomists were earning $650 a month plus benefits 
(including use of a company motorbike).   
 
Variations in payment rates for non-agricultural work 
 
Table 9, below, summarises the survey results for the monthly wages reported 
by 391 respondents employed by rural non-agricultural enterprises. During the survey 
period, the non-agricultural minimum wage was set at MT812,163 (roughly $34.26) a 
month.28  So, median monthly earnings of MT150,000 ($6.33) for working on a 
market stall, or the MT200,000 that was the median amount earned by the 159 
domestic servants (empregadas) in the survey, are not only extraordinarily low, but 
also illegal. Payments reported by empregadas were remarkably consistent, having 
the lowest standard error of the mean wage among the categories surveyed. By 
contrast, people (usually males) working in the transport and construction sectors in 
the same rural towns could earn substantially more, although there was a relatively 
large variation around the mean wage for drivers and bricklayers.  The fourteen 
drivers interviewed had the highest median monthly wage (MT875,000).  
                                                 
28
 The minimum wage for industry and services was increased from MT665,707 to MT812,163 per 
month in May 2002; at the same time the government raised the minimum wage for agricultural labour 
from MT459,222 to MT560,251 per month (AIM, 2002, May 20th).  Very few of the workers in the 
survey were aware of the minimum wage for agricultural labour and none of the provincial officials 
working for the trade union or the Ministry of Labour could quote the current rate accurately.  
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Table 9: Monthly Wages of Non-Agricultural Rural Workers (MT) 
Categories of non- 
agricultural labour N Mean Median 
Std. Error of 
Mean 
 
Hotel/hostel 
 
30 
 
488900 
 
475000 
 
41371 
Restaurant/barraca a 74 379649 300000 31583 
Market/bancab 42 231071 150000 43514 
Domestic servant 159 242440 200000 14494 
Transport driver 14 975000 875000 175078 
Transport other 
(cobrador/chova) c 24 517167 500000 45946 
Pedreiro in construction d 5 780000 750000 135536 
Construction others 
(servente)e 4 707500 700000 47148 
other 39 449615 350000 65702 
Total (paid in monthly 
wages) 391 361486 280000 16184 
Total non agricultural 
sample 458 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Notes: a An informal, ‘street’ bar. b market stall. c Ticket collector or cart-boy. d Bricklayer/mason. e  
Assistant. 
Source: MRLS, 2002/03 
 
 
A classification of jobs and payment methods 
 
The analysis above has shown that rural Mozambicans experience a complex 
range of methods and rates of payment for wage labour. A crude dichotomy between 
privileged labour aristocrats and all other workers cannot capture this reality.   The 
MRLS allows for a more nuanced, although still rather simple, taxonomy of wage 
employment. Thus, Table 10, below, identifies five main types of employment 
obtained by rural Mozambicans, using a mixture of quantitative and qualitative 
criteria suggested by responses to the questionnaire and by more open-ended 
questions and interviews. The main purpose of this classification is to investigate the 
characteristics of those workers who are relatively (un)successful in the labour market, 
as discussed further below.  Here, the earnings (mean and median) and some aspects 
of working conditions (e.g. access to trade unions and compensation for working 
overtime) are tabulated for each of the five types of employment.    
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Table 10 shows that some (770 workers) enjoy access to ‘good’ jobs that 
guarantee a relatively decent and more or less regular flow of income. A larger 
number of workers (708) have only succeeded in finding casual or very low-paid 
(‘bad’) jobs. The five types of employment identified in the Table are not mutually 
exclusive. For example, the second is a fraction of the first. Categories ‘bad1’ and 
‘bad2’ are also partly overlapping and a few workers with access to ‘good’ jobs also 
perform some of the ‘bad’ jobs on the side.  
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Table 10: Better and Worse Jobs – Payment methods and rates 
Types of jobs Good 1 
Monthly paid 
and regular 
income 
 
(770) 
Good 2 
Monthly paid, 
regular income 
in agriculture 
 
(472) 
Bad 1 
Performed ‘ganho’ 
casual work for less than 
15 days per month 
 
(708) 
Bad 2 
Same as Bad 1 and obtained no 
seasonal contracts or non-
agricultural job 
 
(591) 
Bad 3 
Domestic servant + 
below agricultural 
minimum wage 
 
(145) 
Other 
(non 
classified) 
Total 
sample 
 
 
 
(2628) 
Paid monthly wages 
% within job type 100 100 10 1 100 57 40 
Paid on piece or task rate basis  
% within job type 0 0 68 80 0 33 39 
Median payment (daily)  
(number of cases in brackets) 
15,400 
(16) 
15,000 
(15) 
10,000 
(142) 
10,000 
(96) n.a. 
12,500 
(328) 
12,000 
(484) 
Median payment (monthly wage)  
(number of cases in brackets) 
400,000 
(761) 
450,000 
(466) 
 
300,000 
(78) 
300,000 
(9) 
150,000 
(145) 
350,000 
(318) 
360,000 
(1145) 
Median payment (task)  
(number of cases in brackets) n.a. n.a. 
15,000 
(336) 
 
SD/ mean ratio = 1.6 
15,000 
(333) 
 
SD/ mean ratio = 1.6 
 
n.a. 
15,000 
(488) 
 
SD/ mean 
ratio = 
4.5 
15,000 
(824) 
 
SD/ mean 
ratio = 
4.8 
Received payment in kind  
% within job type 0 0 29 34 0 11 13 
Note: SD = Standard deviation 
Source: MRLS, 2002/03 
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Although the median wage of all the agricultural workers classified as having 
‘good’ jobs is still below the statutory minimum, the good2 category workers do 
receive 13 percent more than good1 category workers, and over 25 percent more than 
other monthly-paid unclassified workers. Moreover, these agricultural workers are 
more likely to have access to trade union representation than workers in any other 
type of job (Table 11). However, the benefits they derive from union representation 
are not clear.  Interviews with large-scale farmers suggested that there was little or no 
union activity on their farms – even where formally at least some workers were 
members of a union. Even where the union appeared well organised, there was not a 
great deal of activity at the time of the fieldwork. One or two of the biggest 
agricultural employers stated that in the past unions were combative and even 
aggressive; of late they have only been ‘helpful’. Others said that the closer a farm is 
to a large town or city the more likely that union activity is lively and ‘political’. This 
was confirmed by other employers (and by provincial union officials) who said that 
union officials either never visited farms or that they did visit from time to time but 
would only do so if they could get a lift from the farmer – in other words, one major 
constraint on union officials organising on farms is the lack of transport facilities. 
Clearly, the disorganisation of unions – chiefly the Sindicato Nacional de 
Trabalhadores Agro-Pecuário e Florestais (SINTAF) – and the failure of both 
government and international donors to invest in increasing their capacity allows for 
the high degree of employer discretion in setting wages and their composition in 
terms of money wages, benefits, and payments-in-kind. 
Among monthly-paid workers, the 145 domestic servants receiving less than 
the minimum wage are particularly disadvantaged, since half of them earned below 
MT150,000 per month. The median daily rates of the agricultural workers employed 
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on a casual basis (ganho ganho), whether they are classified as having a bad1 or a 
bad2 job, are consistently lower than the daily rates for any other type of worker.  
Moreover, workers with bad jobs were more likely to be paid in kind (usually 
with food) than any other worker (Table 10).  The most common forms of substitutes 
for money wages reported in interviews with large farmers were dried fish, sugar, 
soap, maize or cassava flour, and capulanas (the cloth wraps worn by women). For 
example, workers might be paid MT60,000 ‘worth’ of maize for two or three days 
work, or a woman worker might work for four days to earn a capulana ‘worth’ 
(according to the farmer) MT35,000.  Obviously, precise estimates of an imputed 
money wage (or the employer’s wage costs) are difficult when payments are made in 
kind.  The lack of precision appears to increase employers’ control over the terms on 
which they acquire labour. 
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Table 11: Employment tenure and other work conditions, by types of job 
Types of jobs Good 1 
Monthly paid 
and regular 
income 
 
(770) 
Good 2 
Monthly paid, 
regular income 
in agriculture 
 
(472) 
Bad 1 
Performed ‘ganho’ 
casual work for less than 
15 days per month 
 
(708) 
Bad 2 
Same as Bad 1 and no 
seasonal contracts or 
non-agricultural job 
 
(591) 
Bad 3 
Domestic servant and 
below agricultural 
minimum wage 
 
(145) 
Other (non 
classified) 
Total 
sample 
 
 
 
(2628) 
Months of tenure with 
same job/employer 
(median) 
12 12 5 4 9 6 7 
Number of days worked 
as seasonal contract 
workers 
Median 
208 
(395) 
208 
(118) 
207 
(107) n.a. n.a. 
210 
(291) 
208 
(749) 
Number of days worked 
as casual ganho 
median 
58 
(390) 
60 
(108) 
20 
(706) 
21 
(591) n.a. 
78 
(735) 
45 
(1508) 
Meals provided at work 
% within job class 42 19 17 16 90 22 27 
Housing provided by 
employer 
% within job class 
23 21 3 2 45 7 11 
Loans (wage advance) 
provided 
% within job class 
35 29 17 17 42 28 28 
Compensation for over-
time work 
% within job class 
46 53 17 4 6 35 39 
Presence of Labour 
Union at workplace 
% within job class 
13 21 2 0 0 11 9 
Source: MRLS, 2002/03 
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In all types of rural employment, job tenure appears to be insecure.  Even for 
those workers who have a ‘good’ job, a high proportion (50 percent) report spending 
12 months or less in their present job.  Those workers combining access to ‘good 
jobs’ with some casual work are able to secure more days of casual work than those 
who rely on casual work alone. More than half of the workers with the worst jobs 
(bad jobs 1 and 2) only manage to find 20 days or less of wage work per year. An 
increase in the number of days per year when they can find employment would have a 
dramatic impact on their standards of living.29 
Even workers selected to hold relatively ‘good’ jobs for more than a few 
months suffer from employment conditions that are below statutory minimum 
standards.  For example, about half of them do not receive any compensation for 
working overtime (Table 11).30  Nevertheless, they are more likely than workers with 
bad jobs 1 and 2 to be provided with housing, meals and credit by their employers.  
On all counts, therefore, workers in ‘good’ jobs, especially in the agricultural sector, 
enjoy much better conditions than workers in other types of jobs. It is also clear that 
small-scale employers and especially Mozambican-owned small farm enterprises are 
unlikely to offer good jobs to their workers, while almost two thirds of workers 
employed by foreign agricultural investors enjoy good jobs in agriculture (Table 12).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29
 This argument about how living standards could be improved is supported by strong evidence from 
India, where the move from casual forms of rural wage employment to more regular rural wage 
employment, implying higher annual real wages, has been  decisive in reducing poverty (Ghose, 2004: 
5112).   
30
 The interviews with large farmers suggest that they have considerable discretion regarding 
compensation payments for long hours of work.  For example, some pay double time for overtime, 
some pay time and a half, and others do not pay for overtime. 
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Table 12 – Workers by employer categories and job types 
(% of workers within each employer category) 
Types of jobs Good 1 
Monthly paid 
and regular 
income 
(%) 
Good 2 
Monthly paid, 
regular income 
in agriculture 
(%) 
Bad 1 
Performed ‘ganho’ 
casual work for 
less than 15 days 
per month 
(%) 
Bad 2 
Same as Bad 1 and 
no seasonal 
contracts or non-
agricultural job 
(%) 
National company / 
plantation 32 32 7 1 
Foreign agricultural 
employer 67 63 9 2 
Local agricultural 
employer 14 14 39 35 
Small 31 8 31 28 
Medium 24 21 30 26 
Large 32 32 17 9 
Source: MRLS, 2002/03 
 
The amount and quality of these non-wage benefits, as revealed in interviews 
with large farmers and in the quantitative surveys, is variable and discretionary. 
Benefits can be and are withdrawn, whenever the employer feels this is appropriate.  
Moreover, almost all the women captured in the MRLS were denied access to the 
most basic non-wage benefits.  Thus, less than 4 per cent of all female wage workers 
were given paid holidays by their employers and less than 10 per cent were given paid 
sick leave or any medical benefits. Only about three per cent had paid maternity leave. 
 
The political economy of labour control 
 
Employer discretion over labour contracts is exercised within a context of 
widespread poverty, a generally weak presence of trade unions and labour inspectors, 
low levels of literacy and education, and, by the accounts of large farmers, a huge 
excess in the supply of labour.31  As local monopsonists, most rural employers are in a 
strong position to shape labour relations by using an array of discretionary gambits in 
                                                 
31
 One farmer in Manica told of his predecessor as farm manager, who had used the local radio to 
announce vacancies: the next day 2,500 people turned up at the farm gate. Another, also in Manica, 
said that recently he needed 100 extra temporary workers and had put the word out via existing workers: 
within two days 300 people came asking for work. A tobacco company operating in Nampula claimed 
that at the start of the buying and grading season there were ‘thousands’ of people lined up outside the 
offices waiting for work. 
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setting wage levels, imposing payment methods, offering incentives and threatening 
to withhold them, as well as by choosing what combination of male and female 
permanent, seasonal, and casual labour to employ.  Nevertheless, many employers 
feel constrained to follow prevailing norms for daily wage rates, or to calculate 
payment rates by reference to the legal minimum wage; they feel themselves to be 
embattled and hemmed in by hostile local interests.  
In particular, large and medium-sized commercial farmers - both Mozambican 
and foreign - are constantly embroiled in social tensions and legal conflicts and face 
encroachment onto their land. These conflicts may involve long-standing claims to 
landownership or grazing access rights that clash with recently granted land 
concessions to large-scale farmers. The conflict can play itself out in different ways: 
through legal challenges and bureaucratic tangles; through insinuations of the 
engagement of spirits and curses; and through aggressive encroachments onto the 
concession. 32 Recently arrived boere farmers in Manica, for example, not only 
complain of the bribes they have to pay to provincial officials, but also that the locals 
frequently burn their crops and stymie their farm equipment.33  One response to 
routine theft and trespassing is to locate selected permanent workers on smallholdings 
along the perimeter, or border area, of the farm.  This response has the advantage not 
only of promoting local social and political allies who are expected to help in the 
struggle to secure contested property rights34, but also, when it takes the form of 
                                                 
32
 On the various forms of conflict that arise in the course of increasing inequality in land holdings and 
the emergence of new capitalist forms of farming, ranging from the petty theft and bureaucratic 
wrangling to both isolated and organised violence, see Peters (2004), André and Platteau (1998), and 
Cramer (2006). 
33
 In Nampula, there are disputes between large farmers—between a long- established plantation 
company and a more recently arrived subsidiary of a major international tobacco firm. This conflict 
involves using political levers at the national level of policymaking and also efforts to manipulate 
smaller local farmers over whom the two firms vie for influence. 
34
 Another means of securing local allies is to co-opt the local ‘traditional’ rulers by paying them and 
giving them the responsibility, as in the colonial period, for recruiting workers.  This strategy was 
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smallholder out-growers surrounding a nucleus estate, of acquiring the labour inputs 
of women and children for tobacco and cotton production without having to employ 
additional wage labour directly.  
The interviews with large-scale farmers shed some light on their preference 
for hiring casual workers on very short-term contracts, rather than permanent workers. 
The largest agricultural enterprises (and generally also foreign-owned enterprises) cite 
the complexity of the labour law and the inflexibility of the fines for firing workers as 
the main disincentive to hiring more permanent workers.  Smaller farmers (and 
nationals) are more likely to explain a relatively low number of permanent relative to 
temporary workers in terms of either insufficient resources to pay permanent workers 
while ‘idle’, or in terms of the workers’ own preferences.  
Both the gender composition of labour force and its division into permanent or 
casual employees are presented (in interviews with employers) either as an employer 
choice or as a worker (and worker’s family) choice. For example, some employers 
might say that they rely on temporary workers because they want to evade the perils 
of a prying bureaucracy and a complex labour law, or to reduce supervision costs,35 
while others might say that their dependence on temporary workers is driven entirely 
by the fact that “they prefer it that way”.  Thus, one very large employer – on a tea 
plantation in Zambezia Province – claimed that he needed 1,400 permanent workers 
but could not get them (he had only about 70), because local people do not want 
                                                                                                                                            
adopted by a new Zimbabwean owned enterprise in Manica that refused to employ anyone who had not 
been sent to the farm by the local chief.    
35
 Permanent workers are legally entitled to various benefits apart from compensation for lay-offs, 
including the right to paid annual holidays and maternity leave.  A typical employer strategy is to lay-
off casual workers on the 25th of the third month of employment (for three days) and then to offer them 
a new casual contract.  Large-scale and foreign-owned agribusinesses adopt this practice to prevent 
workers demanding permanent status after three months continuous employment.  Their argument 
concerning supervision costs is that permanent workers do not work properly: if you want to get people 
to work then you have to pay only by task. 
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permanent employment, they lack ‘ambition’, and have only intermittent need for 
cash. 
These stereotypical prejudices are also evident in some of the large-scale 
farmers’ explanations for the gendered division of labour on their farms and for the 
fact that men are more likely to be permanently employed than women.  The standard 
explanation is couched in terms of physical abilities and/or skills. Many agricultural 
tasks are physically demanding, e.g. pruning cashew trees or cutting sisal, require 
male strength. And many farm jobs depend on the kind of skills that are assumed to 
be male preserves (driving tractors, working as mechanics, acting as supervisors). Yet 
employers commonly make assessments of the relative superiority of women for 
other, less well-remunerated types of job. Most tobacco grading and bundle tying, for 
example, is done by women. Most employers explain this in terms of women “having 
better eyesight” or being more “nimble-fingered”, or women liking to sit and chat 
while patiently working, whereas men get bored and wander off from the work in 
hand.  
Sometimes, rather more general assertions are made. Some farmers claim that 
women are better at jobs “needing care” or that women are better at “ensuring quality”. 
Others argue that women “are more serious”, while men either work for a month or two, 
and then leave, or “pretend to work” while actually slacking, taking cigarette breaks 
furtively, etc. Women are often said to be “more trustworthy”: for example, one farmer 
claimed that women are better to employ for harvesting because “they steal less than 
men”. Finally, men were said by one farmer to be more likely to “run to the labour 
department to make complaints”. These statements seem to suggest that employers 
generally aim to hire at least a certain number of women and girls chiefly because they 
are regarded as more compliant.  
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Yet some employers also had a clear sense that the choice was not theirs to 
make freely. As one (expatriate) farmer put it, the situation in “our community” is 
delicate: hiring women causes tension in an area where there is enormous male need 
for wage labour. Other employers claimed, more convincingly, that they would hire 
more women but that husbands often prevented their wives from working for wages. 
Larger farmers often invoke the idea that they are “developing the local 
population”, “we are doing this to help people”, “nobody round here had anything, not 
even any soap, till we started farming here”, and so on.36 These avowals of paternalist 
intent are partly a means to justify the presence of large farmers in a context in which 
many of them, especially foreign investors, face overt or covert local threats to their 
property. Thus, allocating food production plots along the borders of the farm to 
favoured permanent workers is cited as evidence of concern for workers’ nutrition and 
welfare.  Similarly, a cotton farmer in Nampula grew maize and beans as well as his 
principal crop, but only “to distribute” to the local population, i.e. to sell them locally. 
One well-established practice, usually represented by farmers as evidence of 
paternalistic concern for employees’ welfare, is the sale of food and other basic 
consumer goods to workers through farm shops at “fair prices”, or on credit repaid 
through deductions from wages. However, these practices can also be seen as further 
evidence of employers’ discretion in manipulating real wage rates, or as adding to 
workers’ difficulties in understanding, or complaining about, the relationship between 
their net wages and hours of work.    
 
 
                                                 
36
 Smaller farmers also boast of their charity towards their workers. Breman observed similar claims in 
rural Western Gujarat, where “wage settlement has taken on the character not so much of a business 
transaction, as that of granting a favour” (1985:277). 
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Some Characteristics of the Poorest Workers and their Labour Market 
Prospects 
 
It is not surprising that the majority of the worst jobs (bad2) are performed by 
workers living in the poorest households. One third of the surveyed households lack 
even the most basic of those material possessions, (i.e. a paraffin lamp, a clock or 
watch, a radio cassette, a bed, pairs of shoes and access to some form of toilet), used 
to calculate a simple household asset score. Table 13 contrasts the experience of these 
extremely poor and deprived households with ‘rich’ rural households achieving a 
much higher asset score.  A far greater proportion of the good and a very low 
proportion of bad2 jobs (only 10 percent) are done by members of the richer 
households. Similarly, the majority of bad jobs were done by workers who lived in 
households in which no-one had completed primary school.  In contrast, most of the 
good jobs (over 80 percent) were held by respondents who had attended school.37 
Table 13 suggests that there might be an association between household socio-
economic status and the ability of household members to avoid employment in the 
worst types of rural jobs.  ‘Better-off’ people in rural areas are likely to have very 
significant advantages compared to very poor people in searching and bargaining for 
the best available employment, because of their education, ability to move, household 
connections, and previous work experience.38  At the other end of the spectrum, the 
strong relationship between household possession scores and participation in the 
worst type of insecure casual agricultural labour is graphically illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
                                                 
37
 Work in the best construction, transport and other non-agricultural jobs, which fell under the good1 
rubric, was largely the preserve of relatively well-educated men, living in households with high asset 
index scores.  The MRLS data also suggest that some of the very best jobs in the agricultural sector 
were likely to be held by men aged between 30 and 35 years. 
38
 The MRLS data show that by far the most important channel for obtaining employment was through 
‘relatives and friends’.   
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Table 13: The Share of Different types of Household and Worker in “Good” and “Bad” Jobs 
Source: MRLS, 2002/03 
 
 
 
 
 
Types of jobs Good 1 
Monthly paid 
and regular 
income 
 
 
(770) 
Good 2 
Monthly paid, 
regular income 
in agriculture 
 
(472) 
Bad 1 
Performed 
ganho casual 
work for less 
than 15 days 
per month 
(708) 
Bad 2 
Same as Bad 1 
and no seasonal 
contracts or 
non-
agricultural job 
(591) 
Bad 3 
Domestic 
servant and 
below 
agricultural 
minimum wage 
(145) 
Total 
sample 
 
 
 
 
(2628) 
Possession index group (poorest) 
% within job type 15 18 48 53 21 33 
Possession index group (richest) 
% within job type 47 40 14 10 41 27 
Nobody in HH ever completed primary 
% within job type 37 42 56 56 39 48 
Respondent never attended school 
% within job type 15 20 36 39 15 27 
Females 
% within job type 35 25 60 68 62 47 
Respondent divorced/ separated widow 
female 
% within job type 
17 15 20 22 13 18 
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Figure 1: Possession scores and ‘bad’ jobs 
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Source: MRLS, 2002/03 
 
However, the direction of causality is not obvious. As Table 13 shows, by no 
means all of the good jobs are monopolised by a ‘labour aristocracy’ consisting of the 
members of richer and more educated households.  Table 13 also shows that although 
the worst jobs are much more likely to be performed by women, a significant 
proportion of the better jobs on farms are filled by female workers; and even some of 
the women with the weakest bargaining position in the labour market, 
divorced/separated and widowed women, have been able to find decent work.  Thus, 
entry barriers into good jobs are not insuperable for the poorest households and, when 
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such a job is obtained, the impact in raising their standards of living can be dramatic, 
even in the short-term.39 
  Moreover, the prospects for the poorest labour market entrants can be 
influenced by the policy environment.  State interventions to increase demand and 
tighten rural labour markets can have a positive influence on the prospects for the 
poor.  In India, for example, rapid growth in publicly financed employment had the 
direct effect of providing decent off-farm employment opportunities (in rural schools 
clinics, and in construction), although these new jobs were monopolised by relatively 
well-educated workers from prosperous backgrounds.  Indirectly, however, much 
poorer (female) labour market entrants also benefited, by moving in to fill the less 
well-remunerated private sector agricultural jobs previously performed by members 
of richer rural households (Sen and Ghosh, 1993).   
 
Conclusion 
Rural labour markets remain on the periphery of policy discussions for growth 
and poverty reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, evidence from the largest 
rural labour market survey to be conducted in Mozambique adds to other research in 
showing that these labour markets have become increasingly central to the lives and 
prospects of large numbers of poor rural Africans. Wage labour is not only associated 
with large plantations, agri-businesses or kulak farmers, but is also widespread among 
small and medium scale farmers, though these tend to offer much lower wages and 
worse working conditions than larger employers. Further, rural labour markets play an 
important part in the lives of many people who differ in terms of household 
background, sex, age, education, degrees of poverty and so on. This paper has shown 
                                                 
39
 The life stories of successful women wage workers confirm the transformation in the prospects for 
children and in household welfare that can be achieved after their mother has obtained a decent job 
(Sender et al, 2006). 
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how and why complementary and innovative survey methodologies can shed more 
light on the significance of wage labour relations in rural Mozambique. The 
combination of quantitative survey methods with qualitative techniques has also 
facilitated the task of making sense of complex wage labour arrangements in poor 
rural areas and investigating issues surrounding the unequal bargaining power of 
employers and workers. 
The paper has methodological lessons. The types of questionnaire typically 
applied in large and statistically ‘representative’ surveys are unlikely to reveal the 
complex and multiple payment patterns, employment practices and working relations 
that have emerged from the findings of the MRLS research. Often these patterns, 
practices and relations are specific to individuals or particular types of employer. 
Thus, first, other investigative techniques are necessary to make sense of observed 
differences or apparent inconsistencies within quantitative datasets. Second, survey 
questionnaires themselves need to be designed, and enumerators trained, to capture 
the nuances of differences in payment methods and wage rates. They need to be able 
to pick up a great deal of detailed information on ‘task’s or piece-rates and their 
variation. And questionnaires need to be redesigned to escape the artificial vision of 
rural society imposed by questions framed exclusively in terms of ‘main activity’ over 
the past week or month. Third, representative sampling should be complemented by 
purposive sampling to add information on what are likely, especially in the dynamic 
contexts of rural Africa, to be non-randomly distributed trends, for example in labour 
demand. Fourth, surveys (and complementary techniques) need to be designed also to 
identify the scale and characteristics of rural non-agricultural employment in small 
rural towns, including the employment of domestic servants.  
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Labour market research in rural Mozambique has other implications too. Ideas 
of ‘fairness’ are not universally shared values of a moral economy but, rather, are part 
of the armoury of employers who are often embroiled in social and political conflicts 
at local and other levels. Meanwhile, ‘norms’ of payment and working conditions may 
have developed over time and are influenced by minimum wage legislation. However, 
employers in practice exercise a great deal of discretion in implementing these norms. 
The relatively weak bargaining power of wage workers, especially agricultural 
workers and domestic servants, means that a large proportion of them live on pitiful 
and irregular wages with no protection or non-wage benefits. However, this paper has 
shown that some types of employer are able to offer better working conditions than 
others, despite enjoying similar bargaining power. Some employers offering decent 
jobs  - typically larger employers - are also more visible and exposed to control over 
their employment practices in spite of the generally weak enforcement of labour laws 
by unions and labour inspectors.  
These characteristics of rural labour markets have policy implications. 
Incentives (fiscal, credit, infrastructural, etc) can be devised to generate demand for 
labour among the types of employer most likely to offer decent working conditions, 
instead of being distributed to small “family farms” or to the party/bureaucratic elite. 
40
  Not only journalists, human rights activists, and NGOs, but also foreign donors 
should press governments and trade unions to implement existing legislation more 
effectively and should provide much more support for their ability to do so – 
analytically, administratively and in resource allocations. The evidence suggests that 
even poorly implemented minimum wage legislation does have some influence on the 
                                                 
40
 For example, subsidising  improved airport and cold-chain storage  facilities in Chimoio, capital of 
Manica could facilitate substantial investment in cut-flower production, which employs hundreds of 
workers enjoying some of the best work conditions (for agricultural workers) in the region. On policies 
to stimulate demand for labour more generally see Godfrey (2003). 
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level around which employers exercise discretionary power. Finally, there is a strong 
case for significant expenditures on public information and education, for example via 
radio, on rural women’s rights under legislation on wages and working conditions. 
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